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III—The Mediterranean

            In its undeclared war against France, the Newcastle ministry knew the French planned to invade Minorca as early as October 1755. But, preoccupied by fears of invasion of Great Britain, both ministry and Admiralty concentrated naval power in the Channel. The Mediterranean squadron, already on station and under the command of Captain Edgecumbe, consisted of three ships of the line and some small craft (Clowes 146). It received no reinforcement until Admiral Byng sailed with a squadron of ten ships of the line on 6 April 1756. On one hand, the government had ignored the situation in the Mediterranean until the last moment, and on the other hand, it exerted pressure on Byng to move with all speed.

            Completing crews was complicated by the Admiralty which forbade pulling men from ships in harbor in Portsmouth. After strenuous complaints from Byng, the Admiralty relented to some degree and allowed Byng to complete his crews by raiding the men of those ships in harbor. One battle the admiral did not win: he had to leave his marines with other ships in Portsmouth and take on Colonel Lord Robert Bertie’s fusiliers. The point of the fusiliers lay in land operations against the French in Minorca—if Byng could actually land them as reinforcements. They were not trained for sea combat as marines were, thus reducing their effectiveness at sea, and if they were offloaded before a sea battle, then Byng’s naval forces would be substrength and therefore severely compromised for sea action (Clowes 147).

            Despite these problems, Byng sailed on 6 April 1756 and arrived in Gibraltar on 2 May where he joined Captain Edgecumbe and his small Mediterranean squadron. Here, he learnt that the French had, indeed, left Toulon with an army of between 13,000 and 16,000 men and a squadron of 13 ships of the line. The French had left on 10 April and had arrived by 18 April, taking everything save St. Philip’s Castle, the most heavily fortified position on the island and commanded by General Sir William Blakeney, aged 82 and bedridden by gout. Now at Gibraltar, Byng discovered he had to relieve a siege.

            Byng received no support from Lt. General Folke, the governor of Gibraltar. Folke had orders from the ministry to provide troops, a battalion, to Byng, and to expedite Byng’s necessary refit to attempt the relief of Minorca. Folke put Gibraltar ahead of Minorca: he desired to keep as many, if not all, of his troops at Gibraltar in the mistaken belief that Gilbraltar was now under immediate threat of attack (Tunstall 69). In a Council of War, Folke and his staff came to two conclusions: one, since such sizeable French forces had attacked and besieged Minorca, British forces could not hope to lift the siege, so it would be folly to send men from Gilbraltar and weaken it unnecessarily; two, should Byng engage the larger French fleet and sustain combat damage, Gibraltar, again, would be under threat (Tunstall 72-3; Clowes 147). This justification allowed Folke to refuse to supply Byng with the needed troops. It also, as Brian Tunstall put it, gave “a curt hint to Byng to refuse engagement at sea” (75).

            At this point, Byng, who had to have been demoralized, contributed to his own problems by not forcing Folke to obey the government orders. His second-in-command, Rear-Admiral Temple West, said and did nothing to back up his commanding officer. Additionally, Byng wrote the Admiralty to detail the disastrous state of repair of Edgecumbe’s squadron. Folke wrote a similar letter to the Admiralty, and together, the two letters gave an air of collusion between Byng and Folke. More importantly, Folke’s letter made clear the general’s desire to cover his posterior: "[t]he enclosed copy of the proceedings of the Council will more fully explain the motive for our opinion, and will, I hope, fully acquit me from any imputation of disobedience to His Majesty’s commands" (qtd. in Tunstall 87). By extension, all blame belonged to Byng.

            Folke himself was court-martialed for his refusal to obey Byng’s orders and render the battalion, but he pled discretion allowed by his own orders and the imminent danger of Gibraltar. In the end, Folke received a suspension from duty for a year — "for having mistaken his orders" — and was busted from his regiment by the king (Walpole 229-30).

            Despite the cowardice and deceit at Gibraltar, Byng left on 8 May 1756 for Minorca with his and Edgecumbe’s ships. Sailing east into headwinds made for slow passage, particularly with ships not in the best physical repair, and the squadron did not reach Minorca until 19 May. St. Philip’s Castle and the British squadron attempted to make contact with each other, but before communication could be achieved, the French squadron under Admiral Galissonière appeared. Admiral Byng gave the order to chase at 2pm and made ready to engage the enemy. By 7pm, on the evening of 19 May, the British and French squadrons were two leagues (three miles) apart. Neither sought or wanted a risky night engagement.

            In his tactics, Byng sought the decisive encounter, but in the end, the decision to lask condemned him. In lasking, Byng approached the French line of battle at an angle—somewhere between 30 and 45 degrees—instead of in parallel as required by the permanent Fighting Instructions. The goal here was for each ship in Byng’s line of battle to take its opposite number, cross in front of the enemy’s bow, and rake the enemy ship with a broadside. The enemy ship would not be able to return fire without coming about. This procedure constituted a crossing of the enemy ship’s T (Tunstall 119). A style of engagement known since the end of the 17th century, it could provide a decisive victory with reduced loss of life — a necessity when getting crews was hard at best — but lasking required discipline seamanship, pristine ships, precision sailing, and good luck to succeed.

            Compounding the risky decision to lask, Byng should have divided his squadron into three divisions: the van(guard), the center, and the rear. Effectively, however, Byng divided his squadron into two divisions. It remains unclear whether he did not trust some of his senior captains or he was simply incapable of delegating. West, his second-in-command, commanded the van while Byng held command over the center-rear. Galissoniere did have the tripartite division of his squadron, and this made it easier for the French, who were known for their long-range cannon fire, to come into position and bear down on the British. West’s division, the van, attacked the rear of the French van and came under heavy fire.

            The British took heavy damage aloft, making several ships unmaneuverable. One ship, Intrepid, lost her foretopmast and lay vulnerable to two French ships. Revenge pulled between Intrepid and the two French ships, thus saving Intrepid, but contributing to a traffic jam in the middle of the line of battle. The French exploited this by pummeling Princess Louisa, next in line after Revenge, and forcing the ship behind her to fetch up behind Revenge, well out of position. The ships behind these had to take in sail to avoid colliding with the clustered ships. This muddle created a gap between Byng’s and West’s divisions, and it prevented the rest of line, including Byng’s ship Ramilles, from getting close enough to the enemy to engage fully, if at all.

            The French attempted to capitalize on their advantage, but by the time they sailed into position, the rest of the British line appeared, forcing the French to fire on them instead. Byng had managed to close the gap, but he had lost any advantage, and the French slipped away.

            Byng was fortunate in that this was technically a draw. He lost no ships, but there was loss of life with the French suffering in equal number, if not equal status. Captain Andrews of Defiance was killed outright, and Captain Noel of Princess Louisa had his leg shot off and died several days after the action. Byng’s squadron had suffered severely in terms of its upper masts, yards, and rigging, and Byng used this damage to call a Council of War aboard Ramilles where he presented his captains with five propositions:

•  1. Whether an attack on the French fleet gave an prospect of relieving Mahon [St. Philip’s Castle]? Resolved: It did not. •  2. Whether, if there were no French fleet cruising at Minorca, the British fleet could raise the siege? Resolved: It did not. •  3. Whether Gilbraltar would not be in danger, should any accident befall Byng’s fleet? Resolved: It would be in danger. •  4. Whether an attack by the British fleet in its present state upon that of the French would not endanger Gibraltar, and expose the trade in the Mediterranean to great hazards? Resolved: It would. •  5. Whether it is not rather for His Majesty’s service that the fleet should proceed immediately to Gibraltar? Resolved: It should proceed to immediately to Gibraltar (qtd. Clowes 151).

With the notion that they could do nothing to save Minorca, Byng sailed back to Gibraltar where, on 19 June, he found the reinforcements that had been sent out under Commodore Thomas Broderick, who had arrived 15 June 1756.

            Galissonière’s dispatch reached Britain on 2 June, courtesy of French and Spanish diplomatic pouches, and made Byng and the British fleet out to be disinclined to fight and even cowardly. "After having made their greatest efforts against our rear division, which they found so close and from which they received so hot a fire that they could not break in upon it, they made up their minds to sheer off, and did not appear again during the whole of the next day. Speaking generally, none of their ships long withstood the fire of ours" (qtd. in Clowes 152). Dated 25 May and arrived in Britain on 23 June, Byng’s own dispatch, much lengthier, concluded the engagement was a qualified victory for the British—despite all the difficulties imposed upon his forces—because the French disappeared. Byng made clear in this dispatch that he would refit in Gibraltar, find what reinforcements he could, and re-engage the French as soon as possible:

I sent their Lordships [the Admiralty] the resolutions of the council of war, in which there was not the least contention or doubt arose. I hope, indeed, we shall find stores to right us at Gibraltar: and, if I have any reinforcement, will not lose a moment of time to seek the enemy again, and once more give them battle, though they have a great advantage in being clean ships that go three feet to our one, and therefore have their choice how they will engage us, or if they will at all; and will never let us close them, as their sole view is the disabling our ships, in which they have but too well succeeded, though we obliged them to bear up (qtd in Clowes 155).

This paragraph, which both criticizes the state of naval preparedness and shows Byng in a favorable light, was excised, along with several other paragraphs in the same vein, by Newcastle’s ministry. The cut-down document appeared in London Gazette on 26 June.

            In response to the French view of engagement, the Admiralty sent out Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hawke and Rear-Admiral Charles Saunders, promoted specifically for the purpose, to supercede Byng and West. The Admiralty cut their orders on 8 June, and when Hawke and Saunders arrived at Gibraltar on 3 July, they, per those orders, placed Byng, West, and many others, either required as witnesses or superceded themselves, on board Antelope (Richmond 213-7). That ship sailed for England on 9 July. In the intervening time, the Admiralty had decided to arrest and court-martial Byng. When he arrived at Spithead on 26 July, the Admiralty had him taken into custody and transferred, on 9 August, to Greenwich, where he was clapped into prison. There Admiral Byng remained until transferred to Portsmouth for trial.

IV—The Trial and Execution

            The Newcastle ministry was unstable and had been following a contradictory policy regarding war with France since 1754 — wanting to confine conflict to North America while preserving peace in Europe. This policy had singularly failed, and Minorca was prime evidence of it. Now, the Newcastle ministry had yet another failure of British arms on its hands, and the Minorca crisis, meaning the status of Admiral Byng, became the primary domestic political issue of the summer through winter of 1756. The weak Newcastle ministry tried to foist all blame on Byng in an attempt to save itself from collapse, and to this end, the admiral suffered trial in and figurative execution at the hands of the court of public opinion.

            On one hand, the ministry had sent too little to Minorca too late and yet had fully expected Byng to win a resounding victory, thus raising public expectations. Furthermore, Lord Anson at the Admiralty, despite his private misgivings about Byng’s lack of initiative, had publicly expressed fullest confidence in Byng’s ability to defeat any French threat in the Mediterranean. This attitude matched and even helped bolster public sentiment. Living in Florence, Italy, Horace Mann, an intimate correspondent with Horace Walpole, exemplified British attitudes: “we were expecting every instant that Byng would send home Marshal Richelieu’s [French army commander] head to be placed upon Temple Bar. . .” (Lewis, 20, 560). When these expectations were not realized, the political hue and outcry broke upon the Newcastle ministry, and it used every means in its disposal, including the editing and publication of Byng’s dispatch and the publication of their warrant for Byng’s arrest, to push all rage onto Admiral Byng, who discovered upon his return to Britain a vociferously hostile public crowd.

            Before he had even set foot in England, Byng had been burned in effigy in major towns in Britain, and an enraged mob had attacked his country house in Hertfordshire (Walpole 217). Before and after disembarkation, Byng found himself at the mercy of pamphlet and ballads like “Sing Tantarara Hang Byng” (Walpole 217-8; Lincoln 46). Political theater was nothing new in the 18th century, and The Sham Fight: Or Political Humbug heaped criticism upon Byng, and by extension, the ministry, for corruption, patronage, family influence, and aristocratic degeneracy. (Byng collected fine porecelain.) Altogether, according to the play, these things caused the admiral to fail in doing his duty (Lincoln 47).

            In the face of this kind of public hostility, most of which was quite low-brow, Byng fought back, complaining he was censured by “armchair admirals who required ‘no other Abilities, than a great deal of Ill-nature, and a little Wit’” (qtd in Lincoln 48). He had his full, unedited dispatch published. He also had his committed partisans who attacked the ministry full force. They, or their hired writers, of whom one was Samuel Johnson, wrote pamphlets promoting Byng’s cause. (Johnson wrote two.) Pro-Byng ballads—one of which was composed to "God Save the King" (Lincoln 48) — and anti-ministry caricatures pilloried the ministry for yet more incompetence and corruption. Ultimately the idea came forward that the ministry sought to hang Byng for all its folly, incompetence, and inability to conduct a war, for which there was plenty of evidence built up since 1754; by August 1756, the tide of public opinion began to turn against the ministry (Lincoln 47). Henry Fox, Secretary of State for the South (which in 1782, became the Home Office), wrote to the Duke of Devonshire on 12 August: "I do not think my offer with regard to Pit in the least generous. — For this administration has, I think, lost the good will and good opinion of their country, (which they six months ago enjoyed to a great degree) and without them who can wish to be in administration" (qtd in Black 122).

            Before Byng could even be brought to trial, Newcastle’s ministry collapsed. Part of the ministry’s demise had to do with internal bickering and mistrust. Newcastle put out feelers to William Pitt the Elder, the most eloquent opposition politicians. This move, in turn made Fox distrust Newcastle, who himself felt unable to rely on Fox. The political storm surrounding the Minorca loss nourished the feeding frenzy within the ministry, particularly as it had to face explicit questions on how it handled Byng’s mission. In his reply to Mann on 24 July 1756, Walpole bluntly laid out the line of interrogation: "In short, all your questions of why was not Byng sent sooner? why not with more ships? why was not Minorca supported sooner? all these are questions which all the world is asking as well as you…" (Lewis, 20, 577-8). Pitt pushed this line, demanding a parliamentary inquiry into the loss of Minorca. Amidst the storm, Fox resigned in October 1756. Newcastle attempted to bring in Pitt to stabilize the ministry and lead the House of Commons, but Pitt categorically refused. Unable to find a leader for Commons, Newcastle himself resigned in November, and he was replaced by the Duke of Devonshire as First Lord of the Treasury (prime minister) and Pitt as Secretary of State for the South.

            The change in ministry did not help Admiral Byng. Something of a caretaker and disliked by King George II, this ministry was weak and would prove to be short-lived: in early 1757, Newcastle replaced Devonshire as First Lord, and he and Pitt would work in stable tandem. King George II remained hostile to Byng and unhappy with Pitt, and this, in combination with political paralysis, allowed the prosecution of Byng to go forward.

            Byng had no defense attorney for this proceeding, for it was not the practice of courts martial to provide counsel ("Defence" 3). He also had been denied an extra list of witnesses by the Admiralty, which had accommodated his first request for witnesses. Byng had asked for his first set of witness in a letter dated 4 August, and he requested another set in a letter dated 6 September. The Admiralty’s response, as composed by John Cleveland, the clerk of the Admiralty, on 9 September, made clear the Admiralty wanted the trial over as quickly as possible and found Byng obstructionist:

Under these Circumstances they [the Admiralty] cannot help expressing their Astonishment at your Application for the 6th Instant, with a new list of no fewer than 31 Officers to be sent for, without the least Fact, Proof, or even Allegation to support this Request, or to excuse [its] not being made before; their Lordships look upon it merely as a Scheme suggested to you to delay your being brought to a Trial, which must be the necessary Consequence, if your Application should be complied with; by the same Means you may put off your Trial for ever; it is but applying for a new List every Month or fix Weeks, and at last concluding with a Desire that the whole Fleet may be brought home ("Defence" 30).

Cleveland’s tone and word choice suggested Byng was a coward, and the Admiralty clerk further added a presupposition of guilt, saying that Byng had been "indulged to so great an Extent as may make an Example very dangerous to the Service and Discipline of the Navy; but Justice to the Public requires that Person accused, who certainly may be guilty, should not under the bare Pretence of desiring Means of Defence make Trial absolutely Impracticable" (Byng 30). Byng rather forcefully repudiated charges of obstreperousness in a letter dated 14 September, but it had no effect upon the Admiralty, which dismissed his request for further witnesses and ignored him thereafter.

             The court martial convened on 27 December 1757 under the presidency of Vice-Admiral Thomas Smith. All members of this court martial board were junior in rank to Admiral Byng. On 28 December, Byng was brought before the bar and acquainted with all charges against him. The real business of the court martial began on 29 December and ran through the admiral’s sentencing on 27 January 1757. The court fixated on three naval issues: sufficiency of sail to bear down upon the enemy; failure to close the distance between the two lines of battle; and the failure to fire at the proper distance. Although disputed in the reasoning, the failure to relieve Minorca was established early in the proceedings.

             The two most devastating witnesses for the Admiralty were General Blakeney, the besieged commander at St. Philip’s Castle, and Captain Everritt of Buckingham, Rear-Admiral West’s ship. Blakeney energetically asserted that Colonel Lord Robert Bertie’s fusiliers could have been landed before the battle, particularly as the French were desperate for ammunition, and that with those troops he could have held out until Sir Edward Hawke arrived with relief ("Trial" 6, 8-9; "Proceedings" 11). Captain Everritt brought Buckingsham’s ship’s log with him—to which Byng, conducting his own defense, objected: "[t]he log-book is not a proper Testimony, and therefore ought not to be used" ("Trial" 7). The court allowed Everritt to refresh his memory about things he had actually observed. Everritt’s testimony emphasized that Byng’s division did not carry sufficient sail to bear down upon the enemy and that Byng failed to close the distance between his ships and the French, thus costing the British the victory. Byng’s own flag captain, Captain Gardiner, testified that he advised the admiral to bear upon the enemy, but Byng had objected because of what had happened to Admiral Matthews in a similar in situation in the Mediterranean during the last war ("Trial" 18). (Matthews had himself been court-martialled, and Byng had sat on that court martial board.) Captain Gardiner, followed by Bertie, did establish Byng’s personal courage.

             Byng defended himself in court in a long, prepared statement that was subsequently published. He maintained that he did his best to relieve Minorca, that he had had an inferior force compared to the French in terms of size of ships, weight of metal (the guns), number of men, and even condition of the ships. But most of all, the French held the point of sail and could sail as they pleased. What pleased them was to retreat from the scene of battle, as Byng pointed out:

Now instead of my retreating from an inferior Force, that a superior Force retreated from me, when the Fleet was unable to pursue, I shall manifest beyond all contradiction, and cannot help observing, that perhaps I am the first Instance of a Commander in Chief, whose Disgrace proceeded from so unfortunate a Mistake (“Defence” 5).

From there, he placed the blame for the failure squarely upon the ministry and the Admiralty, which had sent him and his squadron out in such poor condition.

             In spite of a spirited defense, the court martial found that Byng should have landed the troops at Minorca. The board suggested, in hindsight, that he should have used one of his frigates for this purpose before, and even with, the appearance of the French squadron. There was too much separation between West and Byng’s divisions, and this was due to the insufficiency of sail carried by Byng’s division. More sail spread would have allowed all ships to maintain their proper stations, to engage fully the enemy, and to West’s vanguard appropriately. Most importantly, the court found that Byng had failed to do his utmost to relieve Minorca, specifically St. Philip’s Castle, and that he had failed to destroy the French squadron. As a result, they had no choice but to convict him for failing to abide by the Articles of War—Article 12 in specific—and condemn him to death.

             He was sentenced to death on 27 January 1757, but the execution did not take place until 14 March 1757 because several members of the court martial sought to have the conviction overturned in the House of Lords. Captain the Honorable Augustus Keppel, himself to be court-martialed but acquitted in 1778 over an inconclusive battle in the English Channel, sat in the House of Commons and helped push the issue before the Law Lords who demolished the attempt to save Byng. The king refused to exercise his prerogative of pardon, and Admiral the Honorable John Byng died by firing squad at noon on the quarterdeck of Monarch on 14 March 1757, a victim both of political animosity and his own errors of cautious judgment.

Works Cited

Primary Sources:

"Admiral Byng's Defence. . ." London and Boston: Green and Russell, 1757. Readex Microprint, 1985. EarlyAmerican Imprints, 1 st Series, #7865.

Ferne, Charles. "The Trial of the Honourable Admiral John Byng. . ." London and New New York: J. Parker and W. Weyman, 1757. Readex Microprint, 1985. Early American Imprints, 1st Series, #7890.

Lewis, W. S. et al. Horace Walpole's Correspondence with Sir Horace Mann. Yale Edition of Horace Walpole's Correspondence. Vols. 20-21. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960.

“Proceedings of the Court-Martial on the Trial of Admiral Byng. . .” London and Boston: Green and Russell, 1757. Readex Microprint, 1985. Early American Imprints, 1st Series, #7892.

Rodger, N.A.M., ed. The Articles of War. Homewell, Hampshire: Kenneth Mason, 1983.

Walpole, Horace. Memoirs of the Reign of George the Second. Ed. Lord Holland. Vol. II. London: Henry Colburn, 1846.

Secondary Works:

Black, Jeremy. Pitt the Elder. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Clowes, Wm. Laird with Sir Clements Markham el al. The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to 1900. Vol. 3. London: Chatham Publishing, 1996.

Gardiner, Leslie. The British Admiralty. Edinburgh and London: Wm. Blackwood & Sons, 1968.

Frost, Alan. The Global Reach of Empire. Melbourne: Miegunyah Press, 2003.

Howard, David. Sovereign of the Seas. London: Collins, 1974.

Keegan, John. The Price of Admiralty. New York: Viking, 1989.

Lincoln, Margarette. Representing the Navy. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.

Middleton, Richard. The Bells of Victory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

---"Naval Administration in the Age of Pitt and Anson 1755-1763." The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the 18th Century. Ed. Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine. Trowbridge: Leicester University Press, 1988.

O'Gorman, Frank. The Long Eighteenth Century. London: Arnold, 1997.

Pack, S. W. C., Admiral Lord Anson. London: Cassell & Co, 1960.

Rodger, N. A. M., The Admiralty. Lavenham, Suffolk: Terence Dalton, 1979.

--- The Insatiable Earl. London: HarperCollins, 1993.

--- The Wooden World. New York: W. W. Norton, 1996.

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Copyright 2005 by Karen Guest Whitehurst

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Published Quarterly by Lifeloom.com	"Oh what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive." Sir Walter Scott	Winter 2005 Volume II issue 3
W M M New Issue		W M M Archives

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The Web Mystery Magazine is an on-line quarterly journal dedicated to investigating the mysterious genre in print, in film, and in real-life. The Web welcomes well-researched, well-written articles and reviews. Writers are invited to send letters and inquiries to editor@lifeloom.com. Copyright 2005 Lifeloom.com

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