Published Quarterly by Lifeloom.com

"Oh what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive." Sir Walter Scott

Summer 2004 Volume II, issue 2

Satish Sekar holds a BA Hons. degree in Sociology. A freelance journalist since 1990, his work has appeared in The Guardian and The Independent and has been used by television and radio stations throughout England and Wales. The Lynette White/Cardiff Three case was the first case he worked on; since then, he has worked on several cases, many of which have succeeded. Currently, Mr. Sekar is working on a paper on DNA databasing. Fitted In: The Cardiff 3 and the Lynette White Inquiry is his first book; it may be obtained by writing to Mr. Sekar. Direct correspondence to Satish Sekar or to editor@lifeloom.com. Lost Opportunities – Part Two The Death of Reason

A Thoroughly Dishonest Judgment:

            In February 1996, more than six years after the controversial convictions the first appeal of Gary Mills and Tony Poole was heard. The appeal judges – headed by Lord Justice Otton – were distinctly unimpressed by the delay in bringing the case to them. By now the statements gathered by both the Hedges and Claridge Inquiries had been disclosed following a decision by the Law Lords in 1994, but the investigating officers’ reports were still subject to Public Interest Immunity (PII). This was to become a festering sore that still has not been resolved in this case even though such reports became disclosable from April 2004, when the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) took over from the discredited Police Complaints Authority (PCA). The statements of Juke were also disclosed.

            The world’s Macdonald had been replaced by Michael Mansfield QC for Mills and James Stewart QC for Poole. Garry Bloxsome was now their solicitor. Macdonald said that had he had Juke’s statements at trial he would have called him, but bizarrely this did not seem to impress the appeal judges. It would later emerge that Macdonald had made a serious error in law – one that contributed to the miscarriage of justice that occurred in this case. He then compounded this error by making another grave error of judgment. The first prevented the jury from hearing a vital piece of evidence: the second failed to prevent a seemingly damning, but inadmissible piece of evidence from being placed before the jury – evidence that was inaccurate and known to be so. Both related to the hitherto silenced eyewitness, Neville Juke. This will be detailed below and in Parts Three and Four.

(i) Neville Juke:

            Juke was called to give evidence by the judges as neither side wanted to risk calling him. The Crown did not believe him and the defence was unsure what he would say due to the previous interference by Trevor Gladding. The basis of the questioning by the judges was material gathered by Hedges’ Inquiry. Juke insisted that the record of his interview with the Hedges Inquiry team was grossly inaccurate. He was not believed. However, the circumstances of this interview left much to be desired. Due to the controversial nature of his complaint safeguards were required to ensure that this investigation was beyond reproach. Mills and Poole claim that it had been agreed that Juke’s interview would be tape-recorded and that their then solicitor, Michael Hill, was to be present while Juke was interviewed. Yet, the interview took place without Hill being present. Worse still it was not tape-recorded. The Hedges Inquiry team claim that this was because the tape-recording facility had broken down that day. At the very least the interview ought to have been re-arranged for a time when a fully functional tape-recorder could be found. A transcript, purportedly of that interview, based on notes that were not written contemporaneously was produced before the Court of Appeal. Neither the notes of the interview or alleged transcript were offered to Juke to verify as an accurate record of what was said either before the appeal, or even during it. Nevertheless, the judges were happy to rely on the material gathered by the Hedges Inquiry team as accurate. The credibility of the interview was properly a matter for a jury as it affected the central issue of the credibility of Juke. Nevertheless, the appeal judges were happy to rely uncritically on a deeply flawed inquiry. It also emerged that Juke was a paid police informant. Unlike Stadden he was a registered police informer.

            The judges were singularly unimpressed by Juke as a witness and unhesitatingly drew the inference that he had covered Stadden’s eyes to stop her seeing the severity of the attack upon the helpless Wiltshire, as they put it. They roundly castigated Juke for failing to explain the stab wounds to Wiltshire’s backside and pelvic area. However, they not only failed to resolve a far greater discrepancy regarding Stadden’s evidence, but ignored it entirely. The Crown’s case was that all the injuries were inflicted on Wiltshire inside Conduit Street by Mills and Poole. If Stadden’s account was true then she must have witnessed the mystery wounds being inflicted. However, an account of them being inflicted is conspicuous by its absence in all of her accounts. The only window of opportunity for Mills or Poole to have done this is when Juke momentarily covered her eyes. These were the injuries that caused most muscle damage. They would have caused intense pain, regardless of the effects of alcohol and amphetamines, yet none of the eye-witnesses mention Wiltshire so much as yelping, let alone crying out or screaming at this moment in time. Stadden only mentions hearing a squelching noise when her eyes were covered. It seems extremely unlikely that four puncture wounds that were caused by a drill-like object could have been inflicted without so much as an ‘ouch!’ escaping Wiltshire’s lips. None of the weapons recovered from Conduit Street could be identified as the source of those injuries. In fact, the source of those injuries remains a mystery to this day. Consequently, Stadden’s account contains nothing that is consistent with these very important injuries being inflicted. It is also significant that in all of her accounts she never describes seeing the weapon that was used to cause these injuries. There is, therefore, no evidence that these injuries were inflicted in Tony Poole’s flat by either Mills or Poole. This serious omission in Stadden’s account was completely ignored by the appeal judges, while the comparatively minor flaws in Juke’s account were transformed into yawning chasms. Far from underscoring the disparity in injuries between Mills and Wiltshire, Juke’s account may have highlighted the deficiencies in Stadden’s account and supported Mills and Poole’s claims that they did not inflict the mystery injuries.

            Nevertheless, the medical evidence establishes that at least one of the mystery injuries on each shin was inflicted before the first visit to hospital. Clearly the police cannot be responsible for those injuries. However, there is no evidence that either Gary Mills or Tony Poole inflicted those injuries either. There was however, a brief window of opportunity for someone else to have inflicted them. Wiltshire was helped out into the street by Juke. He was alone with Wiltshire when he helped him out of Poole’s flat. Traces of blood consistent with that of Wiltshire was found on the stairs leading up from Poole’s flat. Wiltshire lived in the top floor flat. He may have tried to go to his flat, but did not get that far. He was taken out onto the street to wait for an ambulance, which arrived at around 12.20 in the morning. He was taken to hospital where one ovoid injury on each shin was noted. The other ovoid injury on each shin was not noted on either visit to the hospital. They were either there and missed by the doctor twice or they were inflicted after Wiltshire returned to the police station. The appeal judges thought it too great a coincidence to believe that police could have had access to a similar weapon as had been available earlier and dismissed the suggestion that they could have been responsible for any of the ovoid injuries. As with much else this was a matter of fact that was properly the domain of the jury.

            If, as the evidence suggests, the ovoid injuries were not inflicted in Tony Poole’s flat, at least one on each shin must have been inflicted outside of Poole’s flat, on the stairs between the flats, on the street outside while waiting for the ambulance, in the ambulance itself or at the hospital. The likelihood of either the hospital or ambulance staff being responsible is minimal. This suggests that the most likely explanation is that they were inflicted in the period between Wiltshire leaving Poole’s flat and the arrival of the ambulance. If this is true then either Juke inflicted them outside Poole’s flat or on the stairs or an unknown person did so while Wiltshire was waiting for the ambulance. On any view, Juke was in an extremely vulnerable position to police pressure. There was good reason to suspect that he may have been involved in the violence suffered by Wiltshire. As such, he could have found himself in the dock along with Mills and Poole. According to Juke such leverage was used on him by the police. He claims that he was told that if he did not implicate Mills and Poole the police would have to conclude that he had inflicted injuries himself. It is not for nothing that these injuries are called the ‘Mystery Injuries,’ but the mystery isn’t just what caused these injuries, but who caused them? The appeal judges wasted the opportunity to try to resolve these issues by thorough rehearsal of all of the facts relating to them. Sadly, they were far from finished.

(ii) Inaccurate Evidence:

            These judges upheld the prosecutor’s discretion not to disclose Juke’s statements. The Law Lords would later overturn that decision. The appeal judges went on to say that any prejudice done to Mills by the non-disclosure of the statements had been largely dispelled by a passage of interview. Otton said: “Moreover, it was an accurate summary of the substance of Juke’s second statement…” Unfortunately, it was not. It was ‘inaccurate, damning, graphically illustrated and inadmissible’ according to the appeal judges who heard the April 2003 appeal. It was a hearsay account that should never have been admitted in evidence at all, let alone been relied on as accurate when any impartial review would quickly have found it wanting.

            The criminal justice system was gravely at fault for allowing this account to dominate this case. The Crown ought never to have relied on it in the first place and the defence ought to have objected to its inclusion. Failing that the trial judge ought to have used his discretion to exclude it. Both sets of appeal lawyers appear to have missed its significance, but by far the worst failing in relation to this was that of the appeal judges who relied on it to justify their own opinions on the effect of the non-disclosure of Juke’s statements. They were plain wrong, but worse still they ought to have known the law and stopped this from happening. In 1996 that passage scandalously contributed to keeping Mills and Poole in prison.

            In 2003 it would get their convictions quashed. Far from dispel any prejudice from the non-disclosure of Juke’s statements, this passage added to it immensely. After all, how could Mills call Juke as a witness if the only indication of what he had said to police contained a graphically phrased and damning account that fatally undermined his account of self-defence? Mills did not and could not know that Juke had not given such an account. He could only have known it once the statements were disclosed. The appeal judges, however, must have known that it was not an accurate summary when they claimed it was. This passage alone totally undermines the integrity of that judgment. Sadly, this was not the only example of the judges acting in an inherently dishonest manner.

            The judges concluded that Wiltshire – an outsider from London – had been given a savage beating ‘to teach him a lesson for attempting to muscle in on the Gloucester drugs scene, of which Mills and Poole were obviously key players.’ Unfortunately, this had never been the prosecution’s case. No evidence of this had been presented to the jury. It remains a mystery where the judges got this idea from. During the course of the reading of this judgment Mills and Poole left the dock and refused to return. Mills said that he was sick of listening to a pack of lies.

(iii) The Credibility of Witnesses:

            Juke might not have impressed the jury, but his credibility was a matter of fact that is properly the domain of the jury. A recurrent theme in this appeal was the appeal judges substituting their own judgment for that of a jury. They did however, describe Gladding’s conduct as: “reprehensible,” and “exceedingly unwise.” Amazingly, the appeal judges concluded that Gladding’s conduct did not constitute an abuse of due process of law – meaning an act so unfair and wrong that the prosecutor seized of the facts would intervene in what was in all other respects a regular prosecution. If Gladding’s conduct did not meet that standard, it is difficult to see how it could ever be met. This was an inherently dishonest judgment, but some degree of sense could be made of it if the judges were convinced that Gladding’s conduct somehow fell short of perverting the course of justice and perjury. As will be shown in Part Four, the judges who heard the appeal in 2003 would make the absurd claim that perjury and perverting the course of justice in this case did not constitute an abuse of due process of law and consequently was not sufficient to mandate the prosecutor to intervene. The appeal judges abdicated their responsibilities and set an extremely unwelcome precedent that even serious criminal offences such as perverting the course of justice and perjury committed by senior officers are not sufficient to overturn a conviction.

            Incredibly their attitude towards the alleged eyewitness Paul White was even more bizarre. The evidence relating to Andrew Neale had been discovered by the defence. They accused DCs Payne and Cheminais of suborning perjured evidence by allowing White to give an account in his sworn statement that they knew to be untrue. The appeal judges were left with “a deep sense of unease” over Payne’s explanations of his conduct. That said, they concluded that the jury would not have believed White anyway, so his lies did not matter. They conveniently ignored the original trial judge describing White as ‘an important witness’ and concluded that White added nothing to the case which stood or fell on Stadden alone. They also concluded that the actions of Payne and Gladding did not damage the integrity of the investigation as a whole. The question of why these officers behaved in such a fashion at all was side-stepped completely, as was the question of why the prosecution had relied on White at all if he was such an unbelievable witness. Once again the appeal judges decided matters of fact. So far, they decided the credibility of Juke and White and also the integrity of the inquiry and whether that could have had an impact on the reliability of Stadden’s evidence. Sadly, these were not the only areas of evidence where these judges usurped the role of the jury.

(iv) The Cause of Death and the Issue of Consent:

            They moved on to determining the cause of death. This too was a matter of fact that was properly for the jury to determine. Both the Crown and defence called their own experts. Stephen McCabe thought that the most important feature was rhabdomyolysis – the breakdown of muscle tissue. Professor A. Redmond favoured a raised potassium level while the man dubbed ‘the experts’ expert’ Professor Donald Trunkey of Portland, Orgeon, believed that the major factor was blood loss.

            The judges were greatly impressed by the Crown’s experts and dismissive of Trunkey, concluding that rhabdomyolysis caused by a savage beating was the primary cause of death and that the raised potassium level was an indication of it. They concluded that an increase in blood pressure indicated that there had not been significant blood loss. Trunkey was given no opportunity to respond. He was also badgered by the judges into saying that he would have admitted and treated Wiltshire by force if necessary. This was grossly unfair and a shameful way to treat an expert of such standing, especially as there was evidence indicating that procedures had not been followed properly and that Wiltshire did want to be admitted to hospital and be treated. This evidence was never even referred to in Lord Justice Otton’s court. However, the papers that contained this evidence had been served on the judges. They either missed its significance or deliberately ignored it.

            Professor Redmond had reviewed the issue of whether Wiltshire had consented to be treated, but he appears not to have seen all the pertinent evidence. All of the medical experts agreed that sickle cell trait, fat embolism, amphetamines and alcohol played no significant part in Wiltshire’s death. The disagreement was whether rhabdomyolysis or blood loss was the primary cause of death. Everybody agreed that had Wiltshire been admitted to hospital and treated on either the first or second visit to hospital his life could have been saved. This raised the issue of possible negligence by the hospital and if that had occurred, was it an intervening act that would persuade the court of appeal to intervene?

            The appeal judges concluded that Wiltshire’s life could have been saved had he been admitted and treated on either visit to hospital. However, the law does not permit treatment to be forced upon an unwilling patient. They concluded that Wiltshire had refused consent to be admitted and treated, but had he? Having previously described Wiltshire’s injuries as ‘superficial and not life-threatening,’ Dr. Fletcher claims that the best thing for Wiltshire would have been for him to have been admitted and be treated. He claimed that he wanted to do that, but Wiltshire refused. There is no evidence to back this up and it is a point of vital importance. Secondly, there is no explanation of how the superficial injuries came to be serious enough to merit hospitalisation. Wiltshire cannot say whether he agreed to be treated or not. No written evidence bearing his signature confirming his alleged refusal of consent has ever been produced. This is inexplicable. Fletcher’s evidence is confused, uncorroborated and comes from a man who would have been lucky to just be struck off if he had refused treatment to a patient who not only needed it, but had requested it. In short, Fletcher may have had a very strong motive to lie and his uncorroborated account on this point should be treated with considerable scepticism.

            The law states that you have to take your victim as you find him. In this case it meant that Wiltshire’s alleged refusal to be treated absolved the hospital of accusations of negligence. It also meant that in the judges’ eyes they had not broken the chain of causation between the events in Conduit Street and Wiltshire’s death, meaning that Mills and Poole were guilty of murder. Again the issue of whether Wiltshire had consented to be admitted to hospital and be treated was properly a matter for the jury to resolve. As with much else in this appeal that right was usurped by the judges.

(v) A More Detailed Review of the Consent Issue:

            Professor Redmond’s report of February 6th 1996 says as follows: “It is not the role of the Emergency Department to declare whether or not someone is fit for detention by the Police. I would not approve of any action by an Accident and Emergency doctor whereby they sought to declare a patient fit or unfit for Police custody. Their duty to the patient is to decide whether they require admission to hospital or are safe to be discharged home. This gentleman presenting in these circumstances with the injuries described in the hospital records required admission to hospital. If the medical staff allowed him to be discharged home without making every effort to convince him of the necessity for him to be in hospital for observation both for his head injury and for his stab wounds, then they provided a standard of care that fell below that which he could have reasonably expected from another Accident and Emergency Department in the UK at that time.

            At 04.00 hours he was described as more co-operative. He was telling people to leave him alone. His conscious level was clearly increasing, consistent with the resolving effects of drugs and alcohol. To be associated with a rise in blood pressure is entirely inconsistent with the effects of life-threatening haemorrhage.

            Head injury instructions were given to the Police and he was discharged into the care of the Police. Again, I must emphasise that if the patient refused the advice then his discharge into the care of the Police was clearly unsatisfactory, but this patient was not mentally ill and the doctor had no powers to detain him in hospital.

            He was still bleeding from the wounds that they could not suture. The fact that it is recorded that they could not suture wounds clearly indicates that the patient refused all treatment and in these circumstances allowing the patient to be taken into Police custody was not an act of negligence on behalf of the doctor as he had no means available to him to force the patient to either accept treatment or to remain in hospital.

            The patient was now awake and orientated in time, place and person. He had therefore recovered from the effects of the injury to his head. This is in keeping with the original injury to the head being of a concussional type, but not one associated with more significant damage to the brain. This was confirmed at autopsy. He complained of pain in, and I believe it says, arms. There are some other words that are illegible. He was thirsty and had a belly ache. The further improvement in conscious level again is entirely consistent with the resolving effects of drugs and alcohol. It is entirely inconsistent with a life-threatening haemorrhage. Furthermore, he had a normal blood pressure and a normal heart rate.”

            The highlighted portion in the above-mentioned passage makes it clear that the hospital must use every effort to persuade Wiltshire to stay in hospital. Faye Mcloughlin and Jeff Williams were at the hospital during Wiltshire’s first visit to hospital that night. They do not recollect any efforts from hospital staff to persuade Wiltshire to agree to be admitted to hospital before he was released into the custody of Gloucester Police. It is surprising that no effort was made to try to get McLoughlin and Williams to try to persuade Wiltshire to stay in hospital given their success in getting him to accept treatment earlier. In this context, it can be argued that every effort to persuade Wiltshire to remain in hospital was not made by the hospital. And this was just the first visit. There would be another chance, but the results would be identical.

            In her statement of January 16th 1989 to the Claridge Inquiry, Staff Nurse Sarah Guest says: “We were having some difficulty treating him and trying to attend to his wounds and at one stage we asked a black male person whom I now know to be Geoffrey Williams, accompanied by we understand to be the patient’s girlfriend, to come in to try and get through to the patient that we were trying to help him. … Mr Williams and the patient’s girlfriend were speaking to the patient at various times although I am not aware of what was said. After some time the patient agreed to have his wounds treated, or at least some of them.” Staff Nurses James Insall and Patricia Stalker support Guest. This also refutes Redmond’s claim that Wiltshire refused all treatment.

            It is clear that both Williams and McLoughlin had some influence over Wiltshire and used it to persuade him to accept treatment. The appeal court and subsequently, the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) relied uncritically on Professor Redmond’s assessment that every effort had been made to persuade Wiltshire to remain in hospital. However, Redmond appears to have considered none of this evidence. They also accepted his bizarre claim that Wiltshire had refused all treatment when it is crystal clear that Wiltshire had some treatment. After all, some, but not all injuries had been sutured. How could that have happened if Wiltshire refused all treatment unless it was forced upon an unwilling patient?

            There is no evidence that either Ms. McLoughlin or Mr. Williams were asked to try to persuade him to stay in hospital despite their previous success in persuading him to accept some treatment? It can therefore be argued that the care Wiltshire received even on the first visit to hospital fell below that standard that he was entitled to expect. The same applies to the second visit to hospital. No attempt appears to have been made to contact either Ms. McLoughlin or Mr. Williams in order to try to persuade Mr. Wiltshire to co-operate with attempts to treat him and remain in hospital, despite the unsociable hour that such a request would have had to have been made.

            The appeal judges said: “…As Professor Redmond put it: ‘The doctor who examined Mr Wiltshire could find no evidence of a psychological or a physical condition that rendered him incapable of judging for himself whether or not he should receive treatment. There was therefore no justification for the doctor to seek to restrain Mr Wiltshire in any way. He was capable of making his own mind with regard to refusing treatment or not co-operating with treatment and this he did… Even a more senior doctor would have had no more powers to enforce treatment upon Mr Wiltshire.’”

            From this passage it must be the position of Professor Redmond and the appeal judges that there was no evidence that Wiltshire was anything but capable of making an informed choice. Dr. Fletcher examined Wiltshire on two occasions and could find no evidence of a psychological condition that rendered him incapable of judging for himself whether or not he should receive medical treatment. However, it is Fletcher who says that he asked Wiltshire whether he wanted to stay in hospital and whether he wanted to be returned to the police station. Wiltshire replied ‘No’ to both questions. This was plainly a choice. Either he stayed in hospital or he returned to the police station. He was given no other option. The fact that he did not want either and did not realise that he had not been given another option would suggest that at the very least he was confused about what was being asked of him.

            If the answers given by Dr. Fletcher accurately report the conversation that he had with Mr. Wiltshire it is somewhat surprising that he could find no evidence that Wiltshire was incapable of judging for himself whether he required treatment. On any view those alleged replies show that he was confused as they are contradictory. At the very least Dr. Fletcher should have clarified the position. If Wiltshire was capable of judging for himself whether he needed treatment the doctor ought to have explained to him clearly that he was being offered the choice of either being admitted to hospital or being returned to police custody. By his own admission Dr. Fletcher did not do so.

          Consequently, Dr. Fletcher was negligent in not establishing whether Wiltshire’s alleged refusal of consent was based on an informed understanding of precisely what choices he had been offered or not. The passage quoted above in no way answers this point. As such the contradictory nature of his replies constitutes evidence not considered by Dr. Fletcher, Professor Redmond and the Court of Appeal judges that there was evidence that Wiltshire was at best confused and probably in shock. To suggest that a man – who had suffered such injuries as Wiltshire had, had lost some blood, had significant traces of alcohol and amphetamines on board and had given contradictory answers to simple questions which contained his options – was not confused and/or in shock and therefore incapable of giving an informed refusal of consent to be admitted and treated simply beggars belief.

            During his evidence at the trial, Dr. Fletcher agreed that the best thing for Wiltshire would have been to admit him and treat him on either occasion, but that Wiltshire refused to be admitted and treated and he (Dr. Fletcher) had no powers to detain him against his will, nor indeed could a more senior doctor. Their case is and remains that Wiltshire refused consent to be admitted and treated on both occasions. Had Wiltshire consented to be admitted and treated on either occasion there can be no justification for refusing to do so. Indeed, any such refusal would be absolutely scandalous to put it mildly. It would also constitute evidence of extremely serious medical negligence by Dr. Fletcher that would cost him his career and could constitute an intervening act, thereby breaking the chain of causation between Gary Mills and Tony Poole and Wiltshire’s subsequent death.

            Professor Redmond goes on to dismiss any suggestion that Wiltshire was not fit to make an informed choice on the second visit as well. He says: “It does appear that once again, the patient was refusing to co-operate with medical advice/treatment. Once again, the appropriate course of action for the management of this patient would be to admit him to hospital…”

            The stipulation that every effort to convince him to remain in hospital applies here too. Nevertheless, nowhere in Professor Redmond’s analysis is there any reference to the confused replies given by Wiltshire, or the failure to use the influence of McLoughlin and Williams to persuade him to accept treatment, referred to earlier in this article. The appeal judges are conspicuous by their silence on this point as well.

          At 5.35 in the morning Wiltshire returned to the Gloucester Royal Hospital. This was on the advice of the police surgeon Dr. Arup Chaudhuri. According to Chaudhuri, Wiltshire wanted to go to hospital and agreed to be examined by him so he could be sent to hospital. Clearly this constituted consent to be admitted to hospital and be treated. By 6.15, despite Chaudhuri’s concerns, Wiltshire was returned to police custody, even though hospital guidelines meant that as a repeat admission with head injuries Wiltshire ought to have remained in hospital. The question of how Wiltshire’s consent to be admitted and treated as given to Chaudhuri turned into a refusal in just forty minutes was never considered by the appeal judges and Professor Redmond, let alone resolved.

            But there was even more damning evidence that neither the appeal court, nor Professor Redmond considered at all. In fact, this evidence has never been considered by any court. Languishing in the unused material was a statement indicating that Wiltshire did in fact agree to be admitted and treated on the second visit to the Gloucester Royal Hospital. PC Robert Vestey accompanied Wiltshire on his second visit. He was in the corridor outside the room that Wiltshire was in. He observed Wiltshire’s actions. Like others, he thought Wiltshire was not hurt as badly as he claimed, but he heard Wiltshire say words to the effect of, ‘you’ve got to help me.’ Vestey says that Wiltshire said that to none other than Dr. Fletcher. Another police officer, PC Williams, says that when Wiltshire heard that he was going to be returned to police custody Wiltshire expressed the view that he should remain in hospital, but would agree to go back if he was given something to drink. Williams’ statement makes it clear that this conversation occurred after Wiltshire’s conversation with Fletcher. It appears clear from the statements of these police officers that Wiltshire wanted to be admitted to hospital and be treated and that he had expressed these views more than once and at different times during his all too brief second visit to the Gloucester Royal Hospital.

            I showed Vestey’s statement to a respected forensic pathologist in Britain. He said that it constituted evidence of implied consent from Wiltshire to be admitted to hospital and be treated. This issue has never been considered by any court, let alone resolved. And so, far from requiring him to be admitted and treated by force against his wishes, it appears that there was evidence that Wiltshire wanted to be admitted to hospital and be treated and his wishes were ignored. This issue was another one that should have been left to the jury to consider. There were several reasons why a retrial should have been ordered by the appeal court in 1996.

(vi) A Paragon of Virtue:

            The appeal judges were clearly impressed by Stadden, describing her as ‘a courageous woman.’ They concluded that the jury must have accepted her testimony. This is undoubtedly true. However, there were things that the jury and appeal court did not know about Kimberley Stadden – things that would in all likelihood have revolted them.

            Stadden’s lover at the time of Hensley Wiltshire’s death was Kathryn Halliday. While Stadden was the vital witness against Mills and Poole, Halliday was an important witness in an even bigger case, that of Rosemary West – Fred West committed suicide on New Year’s Day 1995 and never stood trial. Halliday claimed that she had been forced into degrading acts by the Wests and that Stadden was a willing partner in sadomasochistic sex with the Wests. Halliday was frightened of them and eventually left Gloucester because of it. Had the jury known this about Stadden, would they have been so inclined to believe her? Sadly we will never know. While it does not prove that Stadden had lied about Mills and Poole, surely it raises serious questions about her credibility, but that should have been for a jury to determine.

            There was also the question of the lenient treatment that she received over her criminal activities. Stadden had committed cheque fraud offences with Mr. Wiltshire. She could and should have been charged over those offences. Detective Superintendent Bennett had professed surprise that she was not charged in relation to them, but stressed that it was a matter for the Crown Prosecution Service, which decided that a caution would suffice. Why? These were offences of such magnitude that prosecution would normally occur. Stadden evaded prosecution and because of it may not have been as vulnerable to cross-examination about her honesty as she should have been. It had been suggested that a deal had been struck with her that she would avoid prosecution for her own criminal activity in return for her testimony against Mills and Poole. It has to be remembered that without Stadden there was no actual eyewitness to the events in Conduit Street. Without Stadden the prosecution would have stood or fell on the incredible testimony of Paul White.

            Suffice to say, Stadden had a very strong bargaining position. As there is neither a tape-recording, nor transcript of any of the conversations in relation to this it is impossible to prove or disprove whether Stadden got a deal in relation to this. That is not Mills and Poole’s fault, but they were the ones who paid the price. It was incumbent on the prosecution to prove that Stadden did not receive a deal, yet not only did it fail to do so, its assurance that there was no deal was taken at face value. It was not required to provide any evidence to back up that assurance in circumstances where any evidence of such dubious practices may have been concealed or destroyed, or deliberately not recorded in any form. The appeal judges either never considered these possibilities, or dismissed them without deeming it necessary to explain themselves, despite knowing that serious malpractice had occurred in this inquiry. Rather than look at the cumulative effect of the malpractice in this inquiry each example was considered only in isolation. It was yet another of the many errors contained in this judgment – one that would take seven more years to correct.

            Furthermore, there was the question of the payments that she received. It had been suggested that she was a paid police informant. It had emerged that Juke had been a registered paid police informant. There was not evidence that Stadden was registered as an informant, but there was clear evidence that she had been remunerated. The defence had suggested that she had been paid for her testimony – a rent-a-witness. This was denied by both her and the police. The Crown claimed that the payments were merely compensation for the disturbance to her. The appeal judges again accepted these assurances at face value. They never considered the possibility that these payments might have been disguised as something they were not in order to secure her evidence by a police force that was not only desperate for her testimony, but had shown that this was an inquiry that fundamentally lacked integrity.

            In this context, it is a matter for a jury to determine whether Stadden was offered a deal and received payment for her testimony. The jury that convicted Mills and Poole rejected these suggestions, but did so in ignorance of the extent of police malpractice that had occurred in this inquiry. To suggest that the jury might not have reached a different conclusion when considering Stadden’s credibility if they had known of the pervasive corrupt practices of Gladding and Payne in particular is quite simply devoid of logic. Instead the appeal judges decided that the jury had heard Stadden and must have been convinced of the ‘essential truth’ of her testimony. The jury was entitled to hear all the relevant evidence relating not just to Stadden, but of the methods used by the police in this inquiry. Only then could they properly decide whether Stadden had in fact received a deal in return for her testimony, been paid for that testimony and/or been subjected to improper practices by the police and what weight if any should be put on her testimony. All of these issues were properly matters of fact that should have been determined by a jury in possession of all the relevant facts and not by appeal judges who had substituted their own judgment for that of a jury.

Judging the Judges:

            In April 1996 the appeal court delivered its judgment. It dismissed the appeals. Sadly it was an inherently dishonest judgment. It even invented evidence that was not and never had been part of the prosecution case. It boldly stated that Wiltshire had been given a savage beating by Mills and Poole because he was an outsider trying to muscle in on the Gloucester drugs scene, of which Mills and Poole were obviously key players. There never was any evidence to justify this conclusion. It also relied on evidence that it must have known was inadmissible, claiming that the summary that was put to Mills was accurate when it must have known that it was not. If three senior judges did not know this, then questions have to be asked about their competence. They were either mistaken or they were utterly dishonest on that point at least. This was a sad day for British justice – one that would return to haunt the criminal justice system seven years later after a long hard struggle for another day in court.

            At the very least, despite the difficulties posed by the lapse of seven years between the death of Wiltshire and the appeal, a retrial should have been ordered. There were too many questions that remained unanswered. A retrial could have resolved many, if not all of them. Sadly it was not to be. Instead the appeals were dismissed in a fundamentally dishonest manner. The public are entitled to expect and demand far higher standards from their judges.

            The function of the appeal court is not to determine guilt or innocence; it is to determine the safety of a conviction. This was an appeal where the judges lost sight of that and wasted no opportunity to proclaim their own views. David Jessel, presenter of the documentary series Trial and Error, which had broadcast a programme questioning the convictions two years previously, was incandescent with rage at the judgment. Brandishing it on the steps of the Royal Courts of Justice, he declared it the latest ‘shoddy judgment in a shoddy case.’ Mr. Jessel is now a Commissioner of the CCRC – an organisation that would also have a shoddy input in this case.

            This appeal revealed much that was wrong with the appeals process in Britain. Unfortunately, there were many other cases where judges had usurped the function of the jury and lost sight of their function – to determine whether a conviction is safe and not whether they think an appellant is guilty. Appeal judges have no right to make decisions on matters of fact, especially in cases where new evidence affects material issues. This was such a case and it was highly controversial as well. If Mills and Poole were innocent then not only had Gloucester Police framed them, but in all probability they had murdered Hensley Wiltshire as well. A jury that had not heard many pertinent facts did not believe this and nor did the appeal judges who had heard it, but their opinion should not have mattered. The new evidence was of such importance that either a retrial should have been ordered, despite the delay of seven years or the convictions should have been quashed. The only outcome that should not have occurred on any impartial view of the evidence was what happened. Lord Justice Otton had delivered one of the most fundamentally flawed and inherently dishonest judgments in the chequered history of the Court of Criminal Appeal. It would take a further seven years to correct, but even then the limitations of this judgment would have a pervasive influence over the whole case. There was still a long road for Mills and Poole to travel in their quest for justice, or even a fair hearing. The next step was the Law Lords.

The Law Lords:

            Their function is to clarify the law if required. James Stewart bowed out of the case, as the point of law that the appeal judges certified was of public importance did not concern the part of the case that he presented at the appeal court. The appeal judges delivered a parting shot at Mills and Poole. Whilst certifying the point of law as being of public importance, they refused leave to appeal to the Law Lords. However, the Law Lords agreed to hear the appeal anyway, after which they would decide whether leave should be granted. This was merely the last of several points that Lord Justice Otton and his colleagues got wrong – badly wrong.

            The point at issue was whether a prosecutor who does not believe a witness to be credible is obliged to disclose the statements of that witness, or whether disclosure of the name and address is enough. Five law lords heard the appeal. In July 1997 the judgment was delivered by Lord Hutton, who presided over the inquiry into whether claims of the imminent threat from Saddam Hussein was exaggerated by the British government and subsequently delivered a controversial report seen by many as a whitewash.

            The Law Lords were offered the opportunity to hear from Juke directly by Mansfield. They declined, preferring to rely on the fundamentally flawed conclusions of the appeal court regarding his reliability. While it was limited to the question of whether the statements should be disclosed, the treatment Juke had received at the hands of the police formed the essential background to consideration of this issue. This was an error in judgment on their part. The Law Lords decided that the law had to be changed. They concluded that the statements not just names and addresses had to be disclosed, but that no miscarriage of justice had occurred. Consequently, Mills and Poole had won the argument but lost the battle. The war, however, was far from over. The appeals process had taken more than seven and a half years to exhaust domestic remedy. That was outrageous and it almost had the effect of adding another delay onto the original one. But first Mills and Poole would try to get justice at the European Court of Human Rights.

Strasbourg:

            It was now clear that it was going to be a long hard fight for justice in this case. The possibility of taking the case to the European Court of Human Rights had been mentioned. However, the lawyers believed that the Law Lords’ judgment had covered them from criticism by the European Court of Human Rights. As the time limit for lodging the application drew near Mills and Poole were left without legal representation, so I offered to do it for them on the strict understanding that if and when competent lawyers took over I would assist them if they wanted me to, but that they would run the case. I lodged the application and sought expert help. Due to my inexperience I was given extensions to prepare the grounds. I did so and actively sought help, which finally came from the AIRE Centre. They provide expert advice on matters of European law and represent clients without charging them. The AIRE Centre investigated the case and knocked my submissions into shape. Mills and Poole had been told that there was no prospect of success if they took their case to Strasbourg. The odds were against them, but it would soon emerge that there was a reasonable prospect of success after all. The European Commission of Human Rights (ECHR) considers applications for a full hearing before the European Court of Human Rights. It is a common misconception that this court can overturn convictions secured in member states and that it frequently finds member states guilty of human rights abuses. It is a conservative court that rarely finds such abuses. The overwhelming majority of complaints are dismissed by the ECHR without even requiring the government complained against to respond.

            There was no doubt that Mills and Poole faced a daunting task. However, their case was not one that was destined to go the way of the majority of applications. The ECHR required a response from the British government to the complaints made on behalf of Mills and Poole. However, there was another development which subsequently overtook the application to the ECHR.

Piling Injustice Upon Injustice:

            Following the infamous miscarriage of justice that befell the Birmingham Six a Royal Commission was ordered. It was chaired by Viscount Runciman. Among its recommendations was to establish an organisation independent of the government to decide whether cases should be referred back to the Court of Appeal or not. Previously such decisions were the domain of the Home Secretary. In October 1989 the convictions of the Guildford Four were quashed. Since then several other miscarriages of justice were corrected. It became plain that the system was not working properly and that worthy cases were not being referred back for appeal by the Home Secretary. The former government accepted this recommendation, although many others were rejected.

            In April 1997 the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) started work. All cases that were before C3 – the Home Office Committee that considered applications to refer cases back to the appeal court – at that time were transferred to the CCRC and put to the head of the queue for consideration. From then on applications to the CCRC were taken in date order of receipt unless there were medical reasons to consider them early. The CCRC was asked to consider Mills and Poole as a priority. Initially they declined. As they were still without legal representation I acted as their legal advisor. Their case was raised in the All Party Select Committee on Home Affairs by their then Member of Parliament, Tess Kingham. This resulted in an increase in the funds allocated to the CCRC. Sadly, this increase was not contingent on quality standards in its investigations. This case would later prove the need for such quality assurances as will be shown in Part Three. Despite playing a role in increasing the funds of the CCRC Mills and Poole continued to await the beginning of the investigation of their case.

            In October 1998 Gladding lost his libel action against David Jessel and others in circumstances which clearly meant that the libel trial jury believed that he had perverted the course of justice and perjured himself. I invited the CCRC to begin investigating Mills and Poole’s case on the grounds that this finding against Gladding compromised the integrity of the enquiry to such an extent that it constituted exceptional circumstances on its own. The CCRC declined my invitation. In March 1999 I submitted a fresh argument. I contended that the case had taken over seven-and-a-half years to exhaust the appeals process. This was manifestly excessive and it was not the fault of Mills or Poole. This had the added complication of preventing their application being referred to the CCRC from the Home Office. Consequently, they required exceptional circumstances to push their case up the queue. I argued that this piled an extra delay on top of the original delay and that in effect Mills and Poole were being punished for a delay that was wholly outside of their control. This argument quickly found favour and the CCRC began its investigation of Mills and Poole’s case. Before long an issues list was agreed and the investigation began in earnest. Sadly disillusionment with the CCRC was not long in coming.

Copyright 2004 by Satish Sekar

"Oh what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive." Sir Walter Scott